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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is the result of my taking a second look' at the relationship
between Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the current tort
* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus, Vanderbilt Univer-
sity. J.D., 1934, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1935, Harvard University; S.J.D.,
1942, Harvard University.
1. The first look was in Wade, Is Section 402,4 of the Second Restatement of Torts
Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1974).
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remedies for physical injuries2 caused by defective products. The question
is whether the Sales Article preempts and supersedes the common law tort
remedies.
Article 2, with its implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
the purpose 3 and its specific provision for the awarding of consequential
damages, which include "injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty,"4 is broad enough to cover all product-pro-
duced injuries to person or property unless the factual situation comes
within an exclusionary provision such as lack of privity or the existence of a
valid disclaimer. Under our Anglo-American legal system, if there is an
unavoidable conflict between an applicable statute and the common law
that would otherwise apply, the statute prevails. It makes no difference
which of the two came first. If the common law was in existence when the
statute was passed, the statute controls and supplants the common law
rules. If the statute was already in existence when the common law devel-
opment transpired, the constitutional principle of separation of powers
means that the statute still governs and the common law development has
no legal force or effect.
There are substantial differences between the provisions of Article 2
and the common law principles of negligence and strict tort liability. The
only way to reconcile them is to find that Article 2 provides only an addi-
tional remedy, not an exclusive remedy that necessarily invalidates the
common law remedies. Simply stated, the issue is whether the statutory
provisions preempt the field, eliminating the tort actions of negligence and
strict liability.
If the statute had expressly provided that it was exclusive there would
have been no problem; preemption would have to be applied. The Code,
however, does not do this. It thus becomes necessary to study the legislation
to ascertain the intent of the legislative body. This is a matter of statutory
construction for the court, rather than the jury, to undertake. The court
looks carefully for any indication of legislative intent in the content and
arrangement of the sections of other parts of the act, including the title and
the preamble. It may also consider the official comments and study the
legislative history if that history is available and meaningful. Even if the
court finds no direct indications at all, most probably because the legisla-
ture did not specifically advert to the question, it must still make a decision.
In this situation, usually without saying so, the court is likely to think about
what the legislature would have intended if it had specifically considered
the issue and decided it.5 In treating this question, the court will naturally
2. "Physical injuries" are injuries to person or property.
3. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1972).
4. Id. §§ 2-714(3), 2-715.
5. See Curtis, A Better Theogy of Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950). See
generaly E. CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES §§ 248, 310 (1940); R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 235 n.58
[Vol. 48
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be influenced by its own opinion as to what it thinks would be the better
result.
On the issue of whether Article 2 preempts negligence and strict liabil-
ity, the score from the standpoint of court decisions is quite one-sided. One
court, the Delaware Supreme Court, recently held in Cline v. Prowler Indus-
tries ofMagyland 6 that the legislature intended the statute to be preemptive
and that the court therefore had no authority to adopt judicially a rule of
strict tort liability.7 One or two appellate judges in other states have
reached the same conclusion in dissenting opinions, but their views did not
prevail.' On the other hand, a substantial number of courts have held that
the statute was not intended to be exclusive and that tort liability for prod-
ucts may exist as an alternative remedy.9 Many additional courts have con-
tinued to apply negligence liability and adopted strict tort liability without
referring to the issue at all. By implication they must be regarded as con-
struing the statute as not preemptive. A few courts have adverted to the
issue but have declined to pass on it because they found the decision not
necessary in the particular case.
10
The score on the issue from the standpoint of law review treatment is
more evenly divided. 1 Indeed, the preemption viewpoint may perhaps be
(1975); P. MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 116, 191 (12th ed. 1969); IA
J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 23.09, .10, .27 (4th ed. 1972); 2A
id. § 58.03.
6. 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
7. 418 A.2d at 973. Cf. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340,
253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), overruled, Victorson v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
8. See Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 219, 431 P.2d
108, 114 (1967) (Malloy, J., dissenting); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259,
273, 509 P.2d 529, 536 (1973) (O'Connell, C.J., specially concurring).
9. See Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970); Larson v.
Clark Equip. Co., 33 Colo. App. 277, 518 P.2d 308 (1974); West v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337,
363 A.2d 955 (1976); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335
N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509
P.2d 529 (1973); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See also
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir.
1981); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Buttrick
v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Klimas v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 937 (D.R.I.
1969); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1977).
11. The position that Article 2 preempts the field of strict liability for products,
whether characterized as tort or not, is taken by the following: Dickerson, The
ABC's of Products Liability--With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L.
REV. 439 (1969); Dickerson, Products Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of
Section 102A, 44 TENN. L. REV. 205 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson, Constitu-
tionality]; Dickerson, Was Prosser s Folly also Traynor's? or Should the Iudges Monument be
Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dicker-
1983]
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the weightier side from the standpoints of both the number of articles and
the vehemence of the position taken. The lineup from the standpoint of the
• validity and strength of the arguments is, of course, subjective, depending
upon the point of view of the reader. My own position, rendered more firm
as a result of research and contemplation for a second article on the subject,
remains that the statute was not intended to supplant tort remedies, but
that both tort and warranty remedies were expected to exist together as
alternatives. This is, of course, the status of the law in the great majority of
the states today.
Abandoning the position of objective depictor of the state of the law, I
now become an advocate to present the argument that products liability in
tort for physical injury may constitutionally and properly be utilized by the
state courts despite the existence of the U.C.C. I hope the argument proves
to be not only moderate and judicious, but also convincing.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ITSELF
A. The Title
The title of the enactment is "Uniform Commercial Code." Emphasis
may be laid on the adjective "commercial." The preface to the Code de-
clares that it "is a comprehensive modernization of various statutes related
to commercial transactions, including sales, commercial paper," and other
topics. 2 Article 2 is simply entitled "Sales." This alone does not conclu-
sively impel the conclusion that a tort action for physical injury is not ex-
cluded, but it does mean that the primary emphasis and concern of Article
son, Prosser4s Foll]; Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966); Miller, The Crossroads: The Case
for the Code in Products Liability, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 411 (1968); Shanker, A Case of
Judicial Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theo ), 11 AK-
RON L. REV. 697 (1978); Shanker, Strict Tort Theor of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeon Holes, and Communica-
tion Barriers, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shanker, Strict
Tort Theory]; Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 4024 and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970).
The position that Article 2 does not preclude the judicial development of strict
tort liability for products is taken by the following: R. KEETON, VENTURING TO
Do JUSTICE 114-25 (1969); Donovan, Recent Developments in Products Liability Litt'a-
tion in New England: The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 ME. L. REV. 181 (1967); Littlefield, Some Thoughts on
Products Liability Law: A Repy to Professor Shanker, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 10
(1966); Murray, Random Thoughts on Mendel, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86 (1970);
Wade, supra note 1. See also Donnelly, After the Fall of the Citadel: Exploitation of the
Victory or Consideration ofAllInterests, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1967); Rapson, Products
Liability Under ParallelDoctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict
Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965).
12. U.C.C. Preface at iii (1972).
[Vol. 48
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2 is the commercial aspect of the contract of sale, the protection of the ex-
pectancy interests of the parties. This is to be observed in a number of
sections in Article 2.13
One may also lay emphasis on the word "code" and urge that it is the
sole basis for determining all rights coming within its general purview. The
response to this is that
[t]he Code itself is not a traditional, authentic code. It is often
called a group of statutes. The article on Sales Law, Article 2,
may be viewed as a subgroup of statutes concerned with contracts
for the sale of goods, the performance of those contracts, their dis-
charge and remedies for breach.' 4
Particularly important in this connection is section 1-103, which provides:
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions." 5 The first sentence in comment 3 to the
section says, "The listing given in this section is merely illustrative; no list-
ing could be exhaustive."1
6
This section, which White and Summers call the most important in the
Code,' 7 reflects an approach that is inconsistent with the position that the
13. See, e.g., id. § 1-106 ("remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally ad-
ministered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as
the otherparty hadfuly performed") (emphasis added); id. § 2-316 (exclusion and modi-
fication of warranties); id. § 2-725 (breach occurs when tender made, not when in-
jury occurred).
14. Murray, The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy ofArticle 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L. REV. 1, 1 (1981) (footnotes omitted). A footnote
to the first quoted sentence says:
A genuine code totally displaces any pre-existing law. The Code depends
upon supplementary principles of law and equity not displaced by its pro-
visions. . . .A genuine code directs courts to look at the statute afresh in
each case, regardless of prior interpretations. The Code must be read in
the light of the precedents which have provided interpretations of the stat-
utory language. It is clear that our courts, proceeding from the common
law tradition, continue the concept of stare decisis in their interpretations.
One of the principal draftsmen and commentators on the Code, Professor
Grant Gilmore, suggests, "We shall do better to think of it as a big stat-
ute-or a collection of statutes bound together in the same book-which
goes as far as it goes and no further."
Id. at 1 n.2 (quoting Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE LJ. 1037,
1043 (1969)). Contra Hawkland, Unifornn Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 291.
15. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1972).
16. Id. § 1-103 comment 3.
17. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6, 19 (2d ed.
1980).
5
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Code is a traditional code, supplanting all previous statutory and judicial
law. Many of the fields specifically mentioned are general principles of
torts or restitution, outside the immediate scope of contract law. A recogni-
tion of the availability of other tort principles such as negligence seems
implicit.
B. Application of Article 2 to Products Liability
Using the term "products liability" to mean recovery for physical in-
jury to person or property, Code provisions make it clear that Article 2 will
provide relief. Section 2-714(3) provides that "[i]n a proper case any...
consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered.""8
Section 2-715(2) states that "[c]onsequential damages resulting from the
seller's breach include . . . (b) injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty." 9
Do these provisions not only provide for recovery under Article 2 but
also imply that this recovery has become the sole available remedy, sup-
planting any action in tort? It is well to recall that these two provisions are
not ne but are merely declaratory of the common law and the correspond-
ing provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.2' At common law, the action for
breach of implied warranty-awarding recovery for physical injury on the
basis of consequential damages-existed side by side with the tort action for
putting a dangerous product on the market, with recovery for physical
damages as the principal basis of the action.2" The same is true of the
relationship between the two causes of action under the Uniform Sales
Act.2 2 If the Code made no ostensible change in this aspect of the law in
other respects, why should it be held abruptly to preempt the tort action?
In this connection reference may also be made to section 1-106: "The
remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed, but neither consequential or special nor penal
damages may be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule
of law."23 Surely the tort law of products liability is "another rule of
law." 2
4
18. U.C.C. § 2-714(3) (1972).
19. Id. § 2-715(2).
20. See UNIF. SALES AcT §§ 68(7), 70 (1906).
21. For a collection of cases, see 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 614, 614a (2d ed.
1924).
22. See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961)(hula skirt),
aj'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272,
93 P.2d 799 (1939)(food); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633
(1913) (food).
23. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1972).
24. One commentator regards § 1-106 as more readily interpreted as preemp-
tive when read in conjunction with the Code definition of contract in § 1-201 (11):
[Vol. 48
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C. Pimaq. Concern of Article 2
Look again at section 1-106, quoted just above. The primary purpose
of the remedies is to ensure that the aggrieved party is "put in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed." It is the expectation interest
that is the prime subject of protection. Contract damages are the essential
means of enforcing the sales contract. True consequential or special dam-
ages, including physical injury for breach of implied warranty, may also be
included but, like the damages themselves, this relief is also incidental or
consequential. Sections 2-714 and 2-715, providing for the recovery of dam-
ages,2 5 show the same aspect of priority. This approach is to be contrasted
with the common law tort action, which was established for the primary
purpose of affording recovery for physical injury and had its surrounding
rules and principles developed for the essential purpose of accomplishing
this result through a careful weighing and balancing of conflicting interests.
This aspect of Article 2 is not cited as itself having a controlling influence
on the answer to the question of preemption but as a background for evalu-
ating the interpretive implications of certain other sections of the article.
D. Sections in Article 2 that Fail to Make Suitable Provision
for Physical Injut Actions
There are Code sections that have been drafted from the point of view
of protecting the expectation interest without any consideration of the
problems involved in obtaining compensation for physical injury caused by
a dangerous product.
(1) Tests for actionability of the product (sections 2-314 and 2-315):
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for special purposes
are clearly phrased in terms of the expectation interest2' and thus could
have caused serious difficulties in providing remedies for physical injuries.
In practice, however, it has turned out that the test for determining the
actionability of a product is essentially the same whether the action is im-
plied warranty under the Code or in tort for either negligence or strict lia-
bility. Some difficulties may arise regarding instructions to the jury in the
warranty cases.
(2) Requirement of privity (section 2-318): This has probably been
the most controversial section in Article 2. Privity of contract was tradition-
"'Contract' means the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agree-
ment as affected by the Act and any other applicable principle of law." U.C.C. § I-
201(11) (1972). See Dickerson, Constitutionality, supra note 11, at 212 n.25. Since he
takes the position that the Code does not preempt a negligence action, he finds it
necessary to add that the provision does not "necessarily apply to negligence." Why
one and not the other? On the distinction between negligence and strict tort liabil-
ity, see Part IV zifra. It is begging the question to urge the significance of § 1-
201(11) if the validity of that distinction has not been established.
25. U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 2-715 (1972).
26. Id. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
1983]
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ally required in breach of warranty actions involving the quality or fitness-
for-purpose of goods.27 In personal injury cases, courts had been resorting
to various devices for getting around the requirement.2 8 After several false
starts in the process of drafting this section, the version of the draft adopted
and promulgated extended the application of the warranties to members of
the buyer's family and guests in his home.29 This proved to be an inade-
quate palliative, and in 1966 the Permanent Editorial Board promulgated
two alternatives (B and C) to the original section, which was then desig-
nated Alternative A. Alternative B extended coverage to "any natural per-
son who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person."30 Alternative C eliminated the "in-
jured in person" requirement.3" The reaction of the states was mixed.
Each of the three alternatives was adopted in some states, and uniformity
was lost. Others cut the Gordian knot and abolished the requirement of
privity altogether. Still others relied on the Official Comment's statement
that the original section was neutral and not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law regarding privity. 2 Many states took care of the
matter by permitting the tort action to be maintained with its common law
developments regarding privity. In general, states now allow an action
even to a bystander who is injured by a dangerous product.3 3 The experi-
ment has shown the difficulties of attempting to apply the same rules to
actions for commercial damages or rescission and actions for personal inju-
ries. A different rule was needed and the Official Comment indicates
strongly that the draftsmen came to recognize this.
34
(3) Requirement of notice (section 2-607(3)(a)): The requirement
that a buyer must "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered" a breach of warranty, give notice of the breach "or be
barred from any remedy," 35 is taken from the Uniform Sales Act.3" As be-
tween the buyer and the seller, the requirement may serve a useful purpose
if the product does not perform as might normally have been expected,
27. Since the action was on the contract itself, legal theory required that the
plaintiff be a party to the contract or at least a third-party beneficiary.
28. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE LJ. 1099 (1960); Titus, supra note 11.
29. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962).
30. Id. § 2-318 Alternative B (1972).
31. Id. § 2-318 Alternative C.
32. Id. § 2-318 comment 3.
33. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. App. 1970); Giber-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
34. See U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (1972) (alternatives "follow the trend of
modern decisions. . . in extending the rule beyond injury to the person').
35. Id. § 2-607(3)(a).
36. See UNIF. SALES Acrr § 49 (1906).
[Vol. 48
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since the seller can repair or replace it and thus minimize damages. With
regard to personal injury caused by the product, replacement does no good.
Notice of injury is not regarded as a requirement for the bringing of a tort
action for that injury and is alien to the whole treatment of the matter,
particularly where the suit is brought against the manufacturer with whom
the plaintiff had no dealings. It is hard to believe that the drafters of the
Code were thinking of personal injury actions when they continued this
traditional mercantile practice in the Code. Indeed, it was the inappropri-
ateness of this requirement that produced the seminal strict products liabil-
ity case, Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc. "
(4) Disclaimers (sections 2-316, 2-719(3)): Section 2-316 permits a
seller to exclude or modify all warranties, including the general implied
warranty of merchantability; the only restrictions are on the form and lan-
guage used and its conspicuousness. 38 This is in accordance with the cus-
tomary mercantile practice of allowing the parties to a sales contract to
make their own contract, so long as it deals with the quality and usefulness
of the product. It is completely inconsistent with the tort concept that one
who puts an unreasonably dangerous product on the market is subject to
liability for the harm it causes regardless of the contract, especially when
the injured person may not have been a party to the contract.3 9 The draft-
ers did think of a personal injury action when they provided in section 2-
719(3) that consequential damages can be limited or excluded unless it is
unconscionable and that limitation of damages for injury to the person is
"prima facie unconscionable." 40 But this is of no consequence if the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, including safety, is excluded by dis-
claimer. If the original buyer accepts a disclaimer, protection of the injured
user or bystander is nonexistent.
(5) Limitation of action (section 2-725): Section 2-725 sets the period
for limitation of action at four years from the time the breach of warranty
occurs. The breach occurs "when tender of delivery is made." 4 This is
obviously based entirely on the concept that the product is not in accord-
ance with expectations so the buyer has been damaged and has a cause of
action at the moment the article is tendered to him.2 It completely fails to
37. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The Code had not
been adopted in California at the time of the injury in the case, and it was the
Uniform Sales Act provision that caused the trouble. See also Chapman v. Brown,
198 F. Supp. 78, 98-119 (D. Hawaii 1961) ("booby trap for the unwary"), af'd, 304
F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
38. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1972).
39. The leading case on this, of course, is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
40. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1972).
41. Id. § 2-725(2).
42. That this is entirely a contract statute of limitations is indicated by the
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provide appropriate relief in the case of personal injury, where the cause of
action arises only when the injury occurs. If the injured party is not the
buyer, the statute of limitations may well have run before he even has a
cause of action. The drafters were clearly not thinking of personal injury
cases in this section, and if it applies to them the unjust result carries over-
tones of unconstitutionality. The courts have uniformly felt that they must
be resourceful to find a way around such an "unbelievable" result. The
usual method is to find that the provision is not intended to apply to tort
actions.
4 3
(6) Damages (section 1-106): This section provides that, for the Code
as a whole, there can be no recovery of consequential or special or penal
damages except as specifically provided.' In appropriate situations involv-
ing reckless disregard of safety, punitive damages are regarded as desirable
in tort actions. The courts continue to apply them in products liability tort
actions.4 5
(7) Causation: Problems of cause in fact and proximate cause have
frequently arisen in tort products cases, and sophisticated methods of deal-
ing with them are continually developing. The Code has no such treatment
and, though the comments occasionally refer to the expression "proximate
cause," the references provide no helpful guidance. If tort actions are held
to be preempted, are the courts left to improvise?
(8) The plaintiff's fault: Here, too, the tort cases have developed a
network of rules involving contributory negligence, assumption of risk, mis-
use, and comparative negligence. Article 2 offers no means of solving the
problem of apportioning responsibility between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. The nearest approach is comment 5 to section 2-715, which uses
the idea of proximate cause to determine the effect of the buyer's unreason-
able failure to inspect the goods for defects or discover the defect before
use.4 6 This is obviously a torts milieu rather than one of contract law.
(9) Indemnity and contribution: There is no provision for this in Ar-
ticle 2. Perhaps it could be added as a supplementary common law rule
under section 1-103. It may be well to add that the Code concept of
43. See Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1100 (3d Cir. 1980);
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 152, 305 A.2d 412, 427 (1973); Victorson v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d 275, 279, 373 N.Y.S.2d
39, 44 (1975). Conversely, there are cases holding that, if the plaintiff elects to sue
on breach of implied warranty, the four-year limitation period from the time of sale
may apply. See Commercial Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580
S.W.2d 765, 773-74 (Tenn. 1979); Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d
456, 465 (Tex. 1980).
44. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1972).
45. See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975),cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liabilitp Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REv. 1257 (1976).
46. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) comment 5 (1972).
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"vouching in," found in section 2-607(5),4 7 might serve a useful purpose in
the tort cases, particularly in regard to the retailer's liability.
(10) Significance of these sections or omissions: These sections were
drafted as treatments appropriate for adjusting the interests of a buyer and
seller in a contract for sale of certain goods. They grew out of the practices
of merchants in commercial transactions and the experience with common
law and statutory developments over the years prior to the Code. But they
are inappropriate for adjusting the interests of the parties when the defend-
ant supplies a dangerous product that causes physical injury to the plaintiff
or his property.4 8 Experience with the Code has fully demonstrated this,
but the experience was unnecessary. The inappropriateness of the statutory
provisions was easily recognizable to any well trained member of the legal
profession who was ready to give due consideration to the matter. Professor
Karl Llewellyn and his associates were wise and well trained lawyers, and
they surely recognized that they were not adequately taking care of the
problems involved in personal injury actions, although the language of Ar-
ticle 2 indicated that personal injury actions could be brought under the
statutory provisions.
I submit that reconciliation of these apparent contradictions is quite
simple. Article 2 was drafted with the primary purpose of treating the com-
mercial law of sales. Rather than complicating that law unduly by putting
in numerous special provisions to take care of physical injury cases-and
thereby probably jeopardizing widespread adoption of the Code-the
drafters were content to leave Article 2 as primarily a commercial statute
under which a personal injury action could be maintained if desired but not
supplanting the common law tort developments that had come about for
the precise purpose of taking care of personal injury situations. In other
words, Article 2 could be applied to the latter situation but was not in-
tended to become the exclusive means of handling it.4 9
This is entirely a matter of statutory interpretation, based on the ac-
tual language of the Code and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it.
Any court deciding to draw these inferences is acting in accordance with
recognized principles of statutory interpretation and is neither judicially re-
47. See id. § 2-607(5) comment 7.
48. The omissions listed above merely serve to confirm this general conclusion.
If Article 2 had been drafted for the primary purpose of handling personal injury
cases some statutory provisions would have been expected.
49. Perhaps the illustration par excellence of this is U.C.C. § 2-725 (1972), pro-
viding a limitations period that is quite appropriate for a contract action but utterly
unsuitable for a personal injury action, whether in negligence or strict liability.
Surely the draftsmen would have taken the time to prepare a separate limitations
period for the personal injury actions if they had intended that all of these actions
be brought under Article 2. These were experienced men and women, expert not
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pealing a legislative provision nor violating the principle of separation of
powers.
E. Express Language in Official Comments to Section 2-318
The conclusion stated just above is essentially confirmed by two ex-
press statements in the Official Comments to section 2-318, the section in-
volving privity of contract. As discussed above, the section as originally
drafted and promulgated extended the application of warranties to mem-
bers of the buyer's family and guests in his home. This later became Alter-
native A; Alternative B extended the warranties further, to persons who
might be affected by the goods and who were personally injured by them,
and Alternative C eliminated the requirement of personal injury.
Comment 2 states that the purpose of the section is to extend the bene-
fit of the warranty to the designated beneficiaries and then adds that the
section "seeks to accomplish this purpose without any derogation of any
right or remedy resting on negligence."5 ° This statement has been in the
comment since the original promulgation. The final sentence of comment
3, which was added when Alternatives B and C were promulgated in 1966,
reads: "The third alternative goes further, following the trend of modern
decisions as indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A. . . in extending
the rule beyond injuries to the person."5'
The first quoted sentence seems clearly to state that there is no intent
that Article 2 should interfere with the existence or use of negligence liabil-
ity for products and thus there is no preemption. The second quoted sen-
tence demonstrates that the Permanent Editorial Board in 1966 recognized
the existence of strict tort liability for products and expressed no objection
to it, instead offering an optional amendment to section 2-318 to make that
section coterminous with section 402A.52 There is no negative implication
of repeal here, but rather a positive indication of co-existence.
These two sentences from the comments to section 2-318 would alone
be quite sufficient to convince many courts that Article 2 should be con-
strued as leaving the tort law of products liability-whether negligence or
strict liability-for the courts to develop without restriction.
F. Whose Intent-Draftsmen or Legislature?
Ordinarily, the legislature would have no intent independent from that
of the Code draftsmen, but it could, of course, specifically advert to the
problem and thereby acquire a different intent. In Delaware, the only state
to hold categorically that the Code preempts strict liability, the state
supreme court found that this had occurred. In Ciociola v. Delaware Coca Cola
50. Id. § 2-318 comment 2.
51. Id. § 2-318 comment 3.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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Bottling Co. ,53 a 1961 case, the court held that it was outside the judicial
function for the court to change the common law requirement of privity of
contract or adopt a rule of strict tort liability for products since those mat-
ters should be left to the legislature.5 4 In 1967, when the Delaware legisla-
ture adopted the Code, it adopted a slightly modified version of Alternative
B to section 2-318 on the recommendation of a legislative committee which
stated that the recommendation was in response to the Ciociola case.5 5 In
1980, when the issue of strict liability again came before the Delaware
Supreme Court in Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland,5" the court found
that the legislative action meant that it intended the Code provisions "to be
the sole remedy beyond negligence in products liability involving sales
transactions."
57
If the court had already adopted strict liability, would continuing inac-
tion amount to an approval of that position? The court suggested that pos-
sibility. Suppose, in the recent so-called "products liability crisis," the state
legislature passed one of the numerous statutes putting some restrictions on
the cause of action. Would this be regarded as a recognition of the proper
existence of the strict tort action, since it was bein modified? Should it
make any difference which came first, Code or strict liability? I tend to
distrust resort to these fortuitous circumstances as a basis for finding legisla-
tive intent either way, unless there is a reasonable and logical inference that
the legislature did actually contemplate the issue and decide it.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In the late 1930's and early 1940's, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) was engaged in the prep-
aration of a revised Uniform Sales Act. Professor Karl Llewellyn,
recognized as the leading expert on sales law, was draftsman and chairman
of both the Special Committee on a Revised Uniform Sales Act and the
Section on Uniform Commercial Acts.
In 1941, the Section presented a second draft of the Revised Uniform
Sales Act. This draft contained a "new" section 16-B, entitled "Obligation
53. 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961).
54. Id. at 483, 172 A.2d at 257.
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-318 (1978) provides: "A seller's warranty
whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach
of the warranty." The "by breach of the warranty" language was added in response
to Ciociola and in order to bring Delaware into line with the developing law in the
larger commercial states. Id. § 2-318 study comment.
56. 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
57. Id. at 979. In Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 587 (Del.
1976), the court had held that a truck rental was subject to strict liability since
Article 2 did not purport to cover that type of transaction and therefore did not
preempt it, leaving the court to reach its own decision.
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to Consumer and to Dealer for Non-Apparent Dangerous Defect," which
provided:
(1) Where it can reasonably be foreseen that goods, if defec-
tive, will in their ordinary use cause danger to person or property,
the manufacturer of the goods, by selling them or delivering them
under a contract to sell when such defect is not reasonably appar-
ent, assumes responsibility as follows-
(a) To any owner who derives title from the manufacturer
and through the merchandising of the goods as unused goods, and
to any non-owner authorized as such an owner, who in the ordi-
nary course of use or consumption is injured in person or property
or otherwise by reason of the defect; and
(b) To any buyer or sub-buyer, under a contract to sell or a
sale between merchants, who, through a warranty reasonably
made or incurred in ignorance of the defect and in reliance on its
absence, suffers damage due to such injury as is described in para-
graph (a).
(2) The general purpose of this section is to make the rem-
edy available directly against a personable to arrange both reduc-
tion and spread of the risk of dangerous defects, and also to make
the remedy accessible to the person injured. "Manufacturer"
within the meaning of the section therefore includes a person who
processes or assembles or repacks goods which he thereafter mar-
kets for ultimate use in consumption, and includes a person who
by brand, trade-name, label, or otherwise assumes as against the
user the position of a manufacturer or supervisor or sponsor of the
manufacture. The liability also extends to any seller who delivers
goods with knowledge of the dangerous defect.
(3) This section is not subject to negation or modification
by contract, except that between merchants (and so far as is con-
sistent with the warranty by operation of law in Section 14 and
with the rules on modification of remedy in Section 57), a
merchant buyer may limit his own rights hereunder.
(4) This section neither states nor implies a policy with re-
gard to goods which in their ordinary use, and without defect, are
dangerous only to particular persons allergic or super-sensitive to
such goods.
58
The comment to section 16-B stated that the problem involved had become
a serious matter, and that the "courts have thus far worked out . . . [3]
major lines of remedy.
(1) A chain of actions and actions over, by way of breach of warranty
in each successive role.",59 This works out to "clean up the whole matter" if
all parties can be reached, but involves "delay, expense, waste and
uncertainty."
6
58. REVISED UNIF. SALES ACT § 16-B (Proposed Second Draft 1941).
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(2) "An action in negligence against the manufacturer." '6 1 This cov-
ers all necessary plaintiffs and goes against the most important defendant
directly, but there are difficulties in proving negligence.
(3) "A third party warranty by the manufacturing seller based on a
number of different theories by different courts . 262
Other selections from the comment follow:
The solution here proposed does not attempt to displace any of
these lines. It is modelled on the third, and so far as concerns the
proper original plaintiff upon the second also. It seeks to place
direct responsibility upon the link in the chain best able at once to
insure or absorb the loss and to prevent its recurrence. It takes as
the gravamen of liability the putting of dangerously defective goods, by
sale or delive, upon the market.
The chain of actions is not abolished under the proposal. It
runs side by side with this section. But it is believed that with this
section in force such a chain of actions will fall into rapid desue-
tude .... 63
Does such a section belong in a Uniform Sales Act? The law in this
general field is tort-law and market-law rolled into one. The
growth has been in negligence-law (with res ipsa loquitur aiding)
and warranty-law (with third-party beneficiary rules aiding) and
in a deliberate fusion of the two. All that has kept warranty-law
from absorbing the whole field has been the traditional limitation
of "privity"; and some courts have already moved into the con-
cepts of "warranty running with the goods" and of "warranty for
the benefit of third persons." ...
The Draft proceeds upon the position that the regulation of
rights between immediate seller and buyer is in this particular
area impossible of sound adjustment, in the absence of such a sec-
tion as the present one . . . . The position is, further, that the
lines of the tremendous case-law development require consolida-
tion, and require a clear theory for their unification in a national
market.
The base-line of the section reflects the case-law trend. The
new feature lies in a relative precision which some hundreds of
cases cannot be expected to provide as they proceed from particu-
lar instance to particular instance.
(1) Defect. The term is intended to be broad enough to in-
clude defects of manufacture or design, adulteration, presence of
foreign substances, and indeed the whole range of hidden danger,
when the net product appears and ought to be safe to use in the
ordinary manner, but is not.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis in original).
1983]
15
Wade: Wade: Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
(2) "Assumes Responsibility": This amounts, in theory, to an
imposition, by operation of law and from the fact of putting the
goods upon the market, of a third-party warranty obligation run-
ning with the goods. The responsibility depends upon deliberate
action, but cannot be negated by intent to have the benefits of the
action without the burdens.
64
Several remarks can be made about this proposal of section 16-B:
(1) The draftsmen were fully aware of case law developments in
products liability and wanted to do something about them.
(2) They realized that the privity problem would have to be taken
care of and they were prepared to do that by imposing responsibility di-
rectly by law rather than by a warranty implied into a necessary contract.
They failed to take care of the "bystander," but section 402A also did that
and left it for developing case law.
(3) They were concerned about whether a section of this nature could
be justified as a part of the Uniform Sales Act.
(4) The proposal is remarkably prescient. The comment about the
"gravamen of liability" is almost a precise duplication of some explanations
of section 402A.
(5) It was expected that case law would develop the scope and appli-
cation of the section if it was adopted.
(6) In light of subsequent case development, some minor modifica-
tions of the provisions of the section would have been warranted.
The proposed revision came before the annual conference meeting of
the N.C.C.U.S.L. in Indianapolis in September, 1941, and was presented
before the Committee of the Whole. In presenting proposed section 16-B,
Professor Llewellyn said:
This presents one of the most controversial and troublesome mat-
ters which has come before your Conference or come before the
courts of your country for the past forty years. It has occupied
more attention in the legal literature than any private law subject,
bar none, including the Federal Rules. It is simply amazing how
much noise this problem has made, how much litigation it has
caused, the purely quantitative number of cases that have been
appealed to the courts of last resort and the inordinately larger
body of material that has never come to appeal. When therefore
we present this section to you, we do it with proper hesitancy and
trepidation. At the same time, it is suggested that something has
got to be done to clarify the matter. I will proceed to the reading
of the section.6"
He then read the section. Discussions initially centered around subsection
(4) and the allergy problem, and that subsection was tentatively approved.
64. Id. (emphasis in original).
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The question was raised whether the liability should be strict-an insurer's
liability, given a defect. To this, Professor Llewellyn responded:
The question of whether the liability should be as strict as it is
stated is a deep and difficult question. Perhaps I am unduly
moved by being a sales lawyer. Being a sales lawyer, I have come
to the problem over the years by way of seller's responsibility. I
notice, however, that in the accompanying development of negli-
gence law which has gone on side by side the sales development-
and they have often gotten mixed together, many courts have ex-
plicitly mixed them together-the trend toward absolute obliga-
tion in the event of defect is as unmistakable as it is in sales law.
Res ipsa loquitur on this matter has been spread to the place by
the courts where it stops being res ipsa loquitur and becomes in-
surance. I think the thing ought to stand upon the proposition
laid down in the section, but I would not fight for that one.66
The question of explosive cleaning fluids was raised, and the argument
was made that there was no defect if there was a warning of the danger.6
7
Much of the discussion, largely between Professor Llewellyn and Hiram
Thomas, counsel for the Merchants Association, was on the question of
whether the section should be included in the act. Some of the discussion is
quoted:
MR. LLEWELLYN: [B]y and large the cases involving...
[products liability] have been badly seen by the writers and con-
fusedly seen by the courts. The writers have an idea that there is
something peculiar about food. As a matter of fact, the cases do
not show that food is the problem. The cases show that what is
the problem is the manufactured articles of the kind that a normal
customer today doesn't know the innards of and uses at his peril,
and whether it be an electric pad which, for example, burns you
up and your bed, or whether it be a can of beans which turns out
to break your teeth or provide you with an undesired virus or glass
broken in your stomach, it comes to the same thing. In either
event, what you do, as we all know, is to go out and take it. If you
happen to see anything wrong with it, you don't use it, and if you
don't happen to see anything wrong with it, you do use it, and
then you are sorry.
[W]e do not have the experience of the insurance companies
who handle insurance in this matter to assure us that this type of
case runs to a materially less figure in the main than the cases on
maintenance of premises and automobile accidents, so that the
danger of false abuse of such a provision as this appears to be
materially less than one has in other phases of the law.
Contrariwise, the actual need for remedy and reform is tre-
mendous. It is a need requiring attention by such a body as yours,
66. Id. at 92.
67. Id. at 87.
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and it is a need requiring such attention because the legal tools for
giving any remedy are confused, are uncertain, don't guide trial
courts and lead to a welter of appeals which is simply outrageous.
The theory on which the remedy is given is utter nonsense
wherever there has been a theory. I speak quite deliberately. I
have been on this trail for twenty years, and every time I have
found the first beginnings of a good idea in a court, I have found
neighbor courts rejecting it.
If, for example, you proceed along the lines of warranty, then
you run into court after court that says, "But a child can't have
the remedy." You even run into a court that says, "When a wife
buys, she buys as the assumed agent of her husband; therefore she
has not got the remedy." You see, it is nuts, just nuts!
I think that the theory of the section is a clean, intelligent
theory. I think the danger involved is a minor danger. I urge,
therefore, that you include it.
MR. THOMAS: May I be heard very briefly? Commis-
sioner Llewellyn, in his comment on this section, has raised, and I
think very properly raised, the question of whether a law like this
really belongs in a sales act. I think that goes to the roots of the
whole matter. The element of sale in cases of this character seems
to me a mere matter of machinery by which a question gets in
litigation. Essentially the wrong done in matters of this kind is a
tort. As I say, the sale is only a triviality. What difference does it
make in common sense that the man who is injured through a can
of beans that cost him ten or fifteen cents? That isn't the point,
and the cases never take any account at all of the prices paid. The
damages don't get the man back his ten or fifteen cents. It is a
liability based primarily on tort, a duty really imposed by law, if
we are going to have that class of thing. I don't think the contrac-
tual element is really worth talking about.
Logically, the policy of this section seems to me admirable,
and it is beautifully worked out. I know, however, that several
bills of this character, perhaps not going as far as this in their
language or implication, have been uniformly defeated in the New
York legislature largely for the reason that they would open the
door to so much strike litigation. We have an awful lot of it in
New York.
The statistics from insurance I have not considered, but it is
my impression that the amount of insurance against risks of this
kind is not nearly as great or as wide as the amount of insurance
taken out against automobile accidents.
MR. LLEWELLYN: Nor are the collections under it any-
thing like as large.
MR. THOMAS: "No, that is true, but the number of small
claims, very vexatious small claims, that are utterly without merit,
is amazing, and those cases don't get into the appellate courts at
all.
Whether you should have any law at all like this, in view of
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these practical considerations, I don't know, and I am not advo-
cating or opposing, but I do seriously question whether a sales act
is the place for it.
It seems to me that before a law like this is enacted, it should
have the consideration of people who are not primarily interested
in the law of sales ...
MR. LLEWELLYN:. . .I should be perhaps a little slow to
urge the inclusion of any such provision in a sales act if it were not
that I can point you to 250 cases that have worked the thing out in
terms of sales in appellate reports of the last thirty years. Now,
250 cases, if you will permit me to say so, is not a small body of
appellate litigation and would seem to give a touch of validity to
the notion that a sales act could properly deal with the matter. If
you don't want it included in the sales act, I will tell you this,
gentlemen, you had better expressly exclude it because the body of
judicial precedent that will read it in is overwhelming ...
MR. THOMAS: May I make one suggestion, and that is
that in considering the section, the gentlemen address their minds
to the question of whether you are going to get this section in any
form adopted by the state legislature. That is a severely practical
question. I know New York has turned it down time and again. I
think the latest one was to extend a warranty to the family of the
purchaser and his guests. Well, we all envisioned what would
happen. There would be a party over on the East Side and every-
body invited, all the family and all the guests, and there would be
about twenty lawsuits started the next day. Now, those are the
things that stick in the minds of your legislators, and you can't
ignore them.
MR. LLEWELLYN: Without attempting further to pass on
the matter, because it has been deferred for final consideration
after we receive critique, I will state only this about what Mr.
Thomas has said, because I should like you to bear this in mind,
too-I aim to be a practical man as well as my brother. The
legislature, when it comes up, in words, in a special act, has again
and again refused to move, but the Supreme Court of the State is
making movement by the legislature quite unnecessary. It comes
to the Supreme Court in cases, and the law widens with a speed
which is astounding on the matter. We have done little more in
this section than state the actual state of the law, save that we
have left out the confusion therein. That we think to be no loss.68
In the end, at the suggestion of Professor Llewellyn, the Committee of the
Whole agreed to "approve [the section] to be put out for critique and pass
on it when we get our critique next year."
69
The section was apparently not in the Act when a revision came back
to the Conference in subsequent years, and it was dropped from future
drafts. In the meantime the joint project between the N.C.C.U.S.L. and the
68. Id. at 88-93.
69. Id. at 92.
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American Law Institute for production of the Uniform Commercial Code
had developed, and nothing further was heard of section 16-B. But from
the remarks made by Professor Llewellyn about the nature and seriousness
of the problem and the approval of the Act by the Committee, it must be
perfectly clear that the elimination of section 16-B did not come about be-
cause of a belief that the revised Uniform Sales Act-and its successor, Arti-
cle 2-adequately took care of the problem of physical injury to person or
property. If this is so, it is obviously unreasonable to construe the remain-
der of Article 2 as if it was intended to preempt the subject and provide the
sole solution. This would have invalidated all of the existing case solutions
and constitutionally prevented the courts from developing any satisfactory
way of handling what the drafters recognized as a very difficult problem.
Indeed, section 402A of the Restatement comes close to doing exactly
what section 16-B was drafted to do, and there is every reason to believe
that Professor Llewellyn would have been gratified by it as the culmination
of the development of strict tort liability.
It is pertinent here to refer to the position of Dean John E. Murray,
recognized as an authority on interpretation of the Code. Commenting in
1970 on the case of Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. ,7o he quoted section 1-
102-"[t]his act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its un-
derlying policies" 71 -and declared that there "is no difficulty in construing
the Code in terms of its underlying purposes, and assuming that 'underly-
ing' means, at least, that [as] the purposes are not always clearly expressed,
a 'plain meaning' methodology isrejected. ' ' 72 He concluded:
[The] Rule of Construction which courts are commanded to use
• . .suggests that . . .[certain sections of Article 2 were] not in-
tended as the ultimate or exclusive law on products liability; that
a court is permitted if not invited to extend . . . [them] and,
therefore, the adoption of something like 402A is not in conflict
with such purposeful development. Thus the fundamental error
of the majority in Mendel is the failure to construe the Code as it
must be construed according to the basic rule of construction ex-
pressly set forth.73
The episode regarding section 16-B indicates that the drafters were
strongly interested in seeing that a forthright, logical, and unitary system
for providing adequate relief for injured consumers would be made avail-
able to replace the tattered patchwork of fictitious theories described by
Professor Llewellyn. When political expediency dictated that the section be
dropped from the Act, the drafters would certainly have been ready to rec-
70. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), overruled, Victor-
son v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1975).
71. U.C.C. § 1-102(l) (1972).
72. Murray, supra note 11, at 88.
73. Id. at 88-89.
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ognize that the development of section 402A has accomplished exactly the
same goal. This may therefore be characterized as an unexpressed "under-
lying purpose" that the courts are instructed in section 1-102 to "promote."
A second relevant circumstance is the analogous experience occurring
in the 1970's when the Uniform Land Transactions Act (U.L.T.A.) was be-
ing drafted. Certain parts of it involved express and implied warranties and
their ramifications. The draftsmen used Article 2 of the Code as a model
and tracked it rather closely. In the consideration of the Act, some commis-
sioners, remembering the preemption problem with the Code, inquired
whether the U.L.T.A. provisions were intended to preempt the tort law on
the subject. The response was a clear negative. The suggestion was then
made that if this was true it might be well to say so and avoid a recurrence
of the Code dispute. This was agreed to, and section 2-314 was prepared,
stating:
Nothing in this Act determines or affects the liability or nonliabil-
ity of a seller to any person, including the buyer, arising apart
from this Act for bodily injury, death or property damages caused
by a defect in the real estate including any improvement made or
arranged for by the seller of the real estate.
74
The section was discussed and debated at some length, some minor changes
were agreed to, and it was approved.
At the 1975 meeting, toward the end of the discussion of the U.L.T.A.,
one of the commissioners who had opposed the section in 1974 presented a
written statement on it and moved to strike it. Despite a point of order that
the issue had been settled the previous year, the commissioner continued
speaking, urging that it should be stricken so that further consideration
could be given to its implications. He drew some support and the commit-
tee protested mildly on the basis that the section was "neutral" so far as the
courts were concerned. Commissioners who would have supported the sec-
tion were all away, working with another drafting committee whose act was
to appear later before the Committee of the Whole. The motion to strike
the section prevailed by an uncounted voice vote. There was no later op-
portunity to reconsider the matter and the promulgated U.L.T.A. has no
provision on the subject. The relevance to the Code issue is that the drafts-
men expressly stated that they had no thought of preempting the tort reme-
dies, directly contradicting the application of a negative implication.
IV. LINEDRAWING: CULPABILITY V. STRICT LIABILITY
OR TORT V. CONTRACT
Most of the commentators who argue for Code preemption are willing
to concede that the preemption does not apply to a tort action based on
negligence. Indeed, some of them go even further and express doubt
whether Article 2 applies at all to a case that can be based on negligent
74. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS AT § 2-314 (Proposed Draft 1974).
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conduct by the defendant.75 Why this latter position should be taken is
hard to understand. Sections 2-314 and 2-315 on implied warranties refer
only to the condition of the goods. If the goods are unfit or not of mer-
chantable quality because of their unsafe condition, they come within the
literal language of the sections no matter what conduct of the defendant
was involved in their coming to be in that condition. If the plaintiff can
prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendant, it may be in his inter-
est to base his suit on negligence. But as any survey of the products liability
cases will show, there are numerous cases in which a plaintiff has success-
fully sued on both implied warranty and negligence, as well as strict tort
liability, without any suggestion that the two are mutually exclusive so that
it is not possible to recover on both or choose between them.
What is the basis for this concession if the action could be brought
under the Code? Why distinguish between tort actions of negligence and
strict liability in this regard? There is very little discussion of this; it is
usually just tacitly assumed. Perhaps one possibility is the language in com-
ment 2 to section 2-318, the privity section, that the section seeks to accom-
plish its purpose "without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on
negligence." 76 More likely it is due to an awareness of the hue and cry that
would have arisen if it were suddenly declared that the long established
system of negligence liability for products, with its myriad of cases, had
been superseded by the Code and had ceased to exist. It must have been
partly due to the fact that, at the time of drafting the Code, the cases impos-
ing strict liability in tort were a disorganized lot, often using the language of
warranty and resorting to fictitious circumlocutions. In addition, forthright
strict liability for products was a development taking place after Article 2
was promulgated and enacted in some states. On the other hand, strict tort
liability for certain types of situations outside the products field is an an-
cient concept even antedating the separate existence of an action in
negligence.
A. Culpability and Strict Liability
However the explanation for the distinction is made, it is described as
one between culpable conduct and strict liability. How workable is the
distinction in determining the scope of legislative preemption? It runs into
trouble because of the difficulty in drawing the line of distinction. From the
one side, a negligence action does not always require culpability in the
moral sense of that term. Negligence standards are objective. They often
hold an actor to a measure of knowledge that he does not actually have. In
addition, the use of the "doctrine" of res ipsa loquitur means that juries
sometimes hold a person to be negligent when he was not truly culpable at
75. See, e.g., Dickerson, Prosser's Fo4'y, supra note 11, at 485.
76. U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 2 (1972).
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all." Violation of a criminal or regulatory statute is commonly called "neg-
ligence per se." Often this occurs in situations where no real culpability is
involved. Yet long before the drafting of Article 2 it was traditional to call
this negligence. In addition, the courts may themselves lay down a specific
rule of law in substitution for the general negligence standard of what a
reasonable prudent person would do. When they do this, it is still treated as
negligence per se. Thus, a court may declare that it is negligence as a mat-
ter of law-negligence per se-for a manufacturer to put on the market a
product that is unreasonably dangerous. This amounts to saying that his
conduct in doing so is culpable.
Indeed, this is exactly what has happened in several states, where the
courts in carefully spelled-out opinions explain that "strict products liabil-
ity" is really negligence per se, to be treated as such. 7 ' The courts in these
states would thus apparently not be subject to the charge of unconstitu-
tional action in violating the principle of separation of powers.79
The distinction between negligence and strict liability also runs into
trouble from the strict liability side. Strict liability, too, has overtones of
culpability; the conduct has fault elements. The traditional strict liability,
that deriving from the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher,8 ° is commonly recognized
as based on the defendant's engaging in ultrahazardous activity. The fault
overtones are obvious. This is not called negligence because there is no
need to prove negligence in the way the activity is carried on. Engaging in
the activity at all when it creates a greater-than-usual danger of injury to
other persons is essentially an objective form of negligence: negligence per
se.8 ' So, too, with putting on the market an unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct. There are overtones of real fault in committing this act whether or not
there was fault in creating the dangerous condition or failing to eliminate it.
The conduct is tortious and the defendant is a tortfeasor.
Another argument sometimes used for drawing this line of distinction
77. In his discussion of§ 16-B, quoted above, Professor Llewellyn made a point
of the fact that, as a result of the use of res ipsa loquitur in negligence actions, "the
trend toward absolute obligation in the event of defect is as unmistakeable as it is in
sales law. . . . [It now] becomes insurance." See Part III supra.
78. See Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Casrell v.
Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md.
337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
f. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
79. The contention has been made, however, that no matter whether it is tradi-
tionally called negligence or not, if the conduct does not involve culpability there is
no way that it can be negligence. Dickerson, Constitutionality, supra note 11, at 220.
Would this mean that despite the traditional name used in a traditional way, the
court must decide in each case whether the defendant's conduct involved factual,
subjective culpability?
80. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
81. See generaly W. PROSSER, The Pinciple of Ry/ands v. Fetcher, in SELECTED
ToPIcs ON THE LAW OF TORTS 135, 178-84 (1954).
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is that strict tort liability for products is a late development in the law of
torts-so late, in fact, that it came after Article 2 was completed. This ar-
gument might have carried more weight if the creation of strict products
liability had been statutory and a complete change in the law. It was
neither. First, it was a common law development. And it is the nature of
the common law, and especially the common law of torts, to "develop"-to
adapt to meet the problems raised by changing social and economic condi-
tions and the corresponding modification of legal ideas and concepts.
There existed prior to the completion of Article 2 a substantial number of
cases offering varying, somewhat inadequate, bases for imposing what is
essentially strict liability for dangerous products of differing types.8 2 One of
the functions of appellate judges, "restaters," and text and law review writ-
ers is to study and analyze developing trends in the law and to provide a
more logical and more satisfactory explanation of the central underlying
idea behind the cases. This is exactly what happened with section 402A
and the Greenman8" case. The reception given that development by the
courts is an indication of how valid it was. Surely no one could seriously
argue that the applicable tort law must necessarily be limited to that which
had been expressly decided by the courts prior to the promulgation of Arti-
cle 2.
B. Tort and Contract
The other line of distinction is that between tort and contract. I can-
not contend that this is always a clear, bright line that raises no difficulties
in its application. There may sometimes be overlap and not all courts agree
on where the line applies for some types of situations.
But it is a traditional distinction that is well established and used for
many purposes. It is customary to look to the gravamen of the cause of
action. Contract law protects the expectation interest. It seeks to place the
plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the defendant had not
broken the contract. Tort law has as its gravamen the restoring of the
plaintiff to the position he had been in before the defendant's wrongful con-
duct injured him. The details and ramifications of the two sets of laws were
developed in the light of the primary purpose of each.84
82. For a collection of the cases and a discussion of the area, see Prosser, supra
note 28.
83. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
84. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978); W. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED
Topics ON THE LAw OF TORTS 380 (1954). In Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 13, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1965), Chief Justice Traynor
explained:
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic
relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. The history of the
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When the courts talk about the gravamen of a cause of action, even
though the defendant's acts grew out of a contract between the parties, they
almost always find the gravamen to be in tort if the harm is physical injury
to person or property. In the personal service cases-involving doctors, for
example-they almost always hold that the action must be in tort and
should not be brought for breach of contract.
In cases involving a contract for sale of a dangerous product, however,
the action can be brought on the contract for breach of an implied war-
ranty. This is because the Code provides as much, in language that leaves
no doubt of its effect.8 5 The question here is not whether an action for
breach of implied warranty can be brought. Instead, it is whether implied
warranty is the only action, except possibly negligence, that can be brought.
The distinction between contract and tort is thus to be used only to
determine what other actions are available in addition to the contract ac-
tion for breach of implied warranty. Both negligence and strict tort actions
should be available. The gravamen for both is the same.
In addition, the milieu of a tort action is much better suited for the
trial of physical injury cases than a commercial action, particularly when
the commercial action is subjected to the Code limnitations and defenses.
This could be spelled out in detail by repeating, with a somewhat different
emphasis, some of the matters previously discussed. It may instead be bet-
ter to advert to the tidal wave of adoptions of strict products liability
throughout the whole country. Lawyers and judges have readily realized
that the tort milieu is much better adapted for trying the issues and reach-
ing a result fair to both parties.
Even the law review commentators espousing preemption have recog-
nized that (1) in those states adopting strict tort liability the cases are al-
most always tried on that basis rather than on implied warranty, and (2)
the Code restrictions are often likely to produce an unfair result.86 Their
position is that the right construction of the statute requires a holding that
doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to un-
dermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical
injuries.
That Professor Llewellyn, in drafting Article 2, was thinking in terms of a distinc-
tion between contract and tort rather than one between negligence and strict liabil-
ity is suggested b a comment he made to the 1943 Committee of the Whole.
Discussing the privity section and persons outside its coverage, he said that they
would be left "to their remedy in tort." N.C.C.U.S.L., Proceedings of the Commit-
tee of the Whole on Revised Uniform Sales Act 105 (1943).
85. See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 5 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Dickerson, Prosser's Folly, supra note 11, at 486 ("a good social result
built on bad doctrine"); Shanker, Strict Tort Theor,, supra note 11, at 39-46 (recom-
mending amendments to the Code); id. at 47 (results of strict tort decisions "com-
port with a sense of modem justice').
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it preempts the action for strict liability and that the parties can conform to
the statutory restrictions even though they may work unfairly.
When one is construing a statute that does not expressly answer the
issue posed, it would seem to be quite in order to give appropriate consider-
ation to the practicality and overall desirability of the results attained by
the decision. The best, and I think most accurate, construction of Article 2
is that although it is ready to afford relief in the case of physical injury from
a defective product, it is not competing for the business, at least to the ex-
tent of unilaterally imposing a monopoly.
8 7
V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
For the immediate future, it seems unlikely that there will be any sub-
stantial change in the products liability situation. Perhaps another state or
two will judicially or legislatively adopt strict tort liability. It seems un-
likely that the constitutional arguments of the academic preemptionists or
the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Cline v. Prowler Industries of Mav-
land88 that it did not have authority to adopt strict liability judicially will
have a pronounced effect on the status of the law in general.
A number of states, of course, have handled the issue of preemption by
legislatively adopting section 402A or some other provision providing for
strict tort liability. Have these amounted to repeal or preemption of the
implied warranty action under Article 2? I would think that the answer is
no, unless it is expressly provided or clearly implied.
There are some problems with the present state of the law. One is the
87. This should carry with it a corresponding obligation on the part of the
strict liability proponents that they also refrain from engaging in unfair competi-
tion. Tort law should not seek to "gobble up" the actions whose gravamen is the
protection of the expectation interest, putting the buyer in the position he would
have been in if the product had performed in the way it should have. Chief Justice
Traynor, who gave us strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), also gave us the limitations on
the scope of tort liability in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 195, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) ("galloping truck" that did not perform effectively). See Wade,
Chief Justice Traynor and Strict Tort Liability for Products, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 455
(1974). Although there is some disagreement on the matter, the substantial major-
ity rule has come to be, in accord with Seel,, that economic loss deriving from a
failure of the product to perform in accordance with the implied warranties is not
actionable in tort, whether negligence or strict liability. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Two
Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980). A remaining
problem is how to classify the suit when the product does damage to itself. See
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir.
1981); Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171
(5th Cir. 1975); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572
S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
88. 418 A.2d 968, 973 (Del. 1980).
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lack of uniformity. The states have developed differing tests for determin-
ing whether a product is actionable. Statutes passed during the recent
products liability crisis exacerbate the differences and often favor special
interests. Ordinarily, differences in tort rules in the several states have no
particular significance to parties since the issue is primarily local and local
policies may be applied without affecting persons in other states. But this
cannot be said of products liability law. The law in one state may adversely
affect all three parties to a personal injury case-manufacturer, insurer, and
injured party-in other states. The manufacturer's products may be dis-
tributed in many states, even nationwide. He must give due consideration
to the liability law of all the states where he distributes, and this may affect
the nature and cost of his products. The insurance companies are not ac-
customed to calculating insurance rates according to the actuarial exper-
iences in the individual states. If a state in the northeast or on the west
coast develops a rule that is unusually favorable to the injured party, insur-
ance rates and product costs may both rise in other states without any cor-
responding benefit to the consumer. One of the ironies of the legislative
splurge to put restrictions and limitations on liability actions to relieve the
products liability crisis was that such an act in a particular state lessened
the protection for the local consumer without affording any actual relief to
the local manufacturer.
Another problem arising out of the current products liability situation
is that it has become a regular practice in many states for a plaintiff to sue
on all three bases: implied warranty, negligence, and strict tort liability.
While there are many similar aspects among these three theories, there are
some differences, too. As a result, instructions to juries may become so com-
plex and confusing that even the judge and the lawyers are unable to sort
them out, much less the poor jury. Some courts try to alleviate this condi-
tion by requiring an election of the theory relied on before the case is sub-
mitted to the jury. A better way of handling the problem would be to
develop an amalgam of the three theories, set in the right milieu and using
the most desirable features of each.
The United States Department of Commerce undertook to do this by
setting up a task force to study the problem and draft a model statute for
the states to adopt. The draft prepared as a result was carefully and ex-
pertly done but proved unsuccessful in gaining any widespread adoption. 9
More recently, efforts have been made to use the model act as the basis for
drafting a federal act to be passed by Congress. Committees in both the
Senate and the House have prepared tentative drafts that are gradually
approaching a consensus.90
A federal act would solve many problems, but it might well create
89. See MODEL STATUTE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Tentative Draft 1980).
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others. The first and most important is that of making certain that the act
establishes a fair balance in protecting the interests of the adverse parties.
This requires nc'. only drafting skill and legal expertise but also an innately
impartial and objective point of view. It also requires careful avoidance of
some of the usual disadvantages of legislation. The gravamen of these
problems lies in tort rather than commercial law. Rather than the precision
and rigidity often sought for commercial law, what is needed are flexible
terms and standards. Professor Llewellyn saw this clearly and sought to use
standards like good faith and reasonableness to refer to underlying purposes
and to allow case law development.
There is a remarkable coincidence between the situation in 1940, when
the revised Uniform Sales Act was being prepared, and the present. On
that occasion, while the uniform act was being worked on, a similar federal
act was under consideration in Congress.9" The federal act did not succeed,
but the uniform act became a part of the Uniform Commercial Code and
was adopted with resounding success. Today, the model act having fallen
by the wayside, a federal act may succeed, provided it deserves success.
It is a tragedy that Karl Llewellyn is not now available to help draft it.
I have a vague, fleeting memory of an A.A.L.S. Convention roundtable ses-
sion some forty years ago. It was apparently an impromptu affair at which
Professor Llewellyn presented the idea behind his section 16-B with all of
his usual sparkle and verve. Two torts professors who had not seen the draft
before coming to Chicago spoke in opposition. They were Leon Green and
a brash young law teacher named John Wade. My remarks, as I vaguely
recall, were in praise of the flexible standards of the tort law and how they
facilitated the attainment ofjustice between the parties after they had "got-
ten into a mess," as distinguished from the more precise planning rules of
commercial law. Professor Llewellyn effectively responded by pointing to
the flexible terms and standards in his statutory provisions.
Today, after leisurely studying his section 16-B, I pay belated homage
to him. His draft was remarkably prescient.92 "There were giants in the
earth in those days . .."!
91. A copy of the bill and articles regarding it are found in The Proposed Federal
Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 537, 668 (1940).
92. One place where it anticipates later developments is the distinction drawn
between manufacturer and seller and the provision that the seller's liability depends
on his "knowledge of the dangerous defect." A number of the recent state statutes
have made the retailer's liability dependant on his negligence-unless it is not feasi-
ble to hold the manufacturer liable. This raises some interesting problems.
93. Genesis 6:4 (King James).
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